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ABSTRACT
Since the inception of the integrated circuit (IC), the size of the
transistors used to construct them continually shrink. While this
advancement significantly improves computing capability, the as-
sociated massive complexity forces IC designers to outsource fab-
rication. Outsourcing presents a security threat: comprehensive
post-fabrication inspection is infeasible given the size of modern
ICs, thus it is nearly impossible to know if the foundry has al-
tered your design during fabrication (i.e., inserted a hardware Tro-
jan). Defending against a foundry-side adversary is challenging
because—with as little as two gates—hardware Trojans can com-
pletely undermine software security. Prior work attempts to both
detect [2, 24, 40, 44, 51, 54] and prevent [4, 5, 60] such foundry-side
attacks, but all existing defenses are ineffective against the most
advanced hardware Trojans [61].
We present Defensive Routing (DR), a preventive layout-level
defense against untrusted foundries, capable of thwarting the in-
sertion of even the stealthiest hardware Trojans. DR is directed and
routing-centric: it prevents foundry-side attackers from connecting
rogue wires to security-critical wires by shielding them with guard
wires. Unlike shield wires commonly deployed for cross-talk reduc-
tion, DR guard wires present an additional technical challenge: they
must be tamper-evident in both the digital and analog domains. To
address this challenge, we present two different categories of guard
wires: natural and synthetic. Natural guard wires are comprised of
pre-existing wires that we route adjacent to security-critical wires,
while synthetic guard wires are added to the design specifically
to protect security-critical wires. Natural guard wires require no
additional hardware and are digitally tamper-evident. Synthetic
guard wires require additional hardware, but are tamper-evident in
both the digital and analog domains.
We implement automated tools for deploying both types of guard
wires in IC layouts of commercial complexity. We evaluate the pro-
tections provided by both natural and synthetic guard wires across
thee different IC designs: a processor and AES and DSP accelerators.
We then compare the efficacy of DR to existing placement-centric
layout-level defenses. DR is shown to successfully defend against
even the stealthiest hardware Trojans, across several designs, with
less than 1% power, performance, and area overheads.
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Figure 1: DR is a preventive layout-level defense against fabrication-time
attacks. It shields security-critical wires in an IC with tamper-evident guard
wires. This prevents attackers from attaching their rouge wires to security-
critical wires in the victim design. Note: same-layer guard wire end-caps not
shown for clarity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Integrated circuits (ICs) are the foundation of computing systems.
Security vulnerabilities in silicon are devastating as they subvert
even formally verified software. For almost 50 years, the transistors
within ICs have continued to shrink, enhancing performance while
reducing power and area usage. However, these advances that push
the laws of physics come with a financial cost: the price to build a
3nm fabrication facility capable of producing ICs at a commercial
scale is estimated to be $15–20B [30]. Even when entities can af-
ford to make such an investment, they must continually run the
IC fabrication line (approximately 40,000 wafers/month)as many
fabrication process cannot be readily stopped and restarted.
This extreme cost forces most semi-conductor companies, and
even nation states, to become “fabless”, i.e., they outsource fab-
rication. As of late August 2018, only 3 companies in the world
(Intel, Samsung, and TSMC) have capabilities to fabricate ICs at the
10/7nm process nodes [31]. This presents a security threat: fabless
semiconductor companies and nation states must trust these three
manufacturers (and their partners) not to alter their designs at any
point throughout the fabrication process (i.e., implant an attack).
The most stealthy and controllable fabrication-time attacks in-
volve inserting additional1 circuit components designed to mali-
ciously subvert the functionality of the chip (i.e., an additive hard-
ware Trojan). Until recently, fabrication-time attacks were only con-
trived and demonstrated in literature. In October 2018, Bloomberg
1Additive hardware Trojans are a class of Trojan designs which require additional
hardware to be added to a circuit design. The only non-additive Trojans that have
been conceived are the dopant-level Trojans [9, 28], which have limited controllability
and are detectable [51].
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Businessweek published an article detailing a fabrication-time at-
tack discovered in the wild [45]. This attack was carried out at
the printed circuit board (PCB) level and involved adding a rogue
IC to server motherboards designed by Supermicro. The rogue IC
was placed on the motherboard such that it could tamper with
memory writes. While fabrication-time attacks at the PCB level
are non-trivial to detect, fabrication-time attacks carried out at the
IC level are even stealthier. Circuit components at the IC level are
orders-of-magnitude more numerous and smaller than PCB level
components, i.e., billions vs. tens and nms vs.mms.
To date, there are two ways of defending against fabrication-time
attacks: post-fabrication detection and pre-fabrication prevention.
The former tries to detect the presence of hardware Trojan com-
ponents through various means after the chip has been fabricated,
while the latter attempts to alter an IC’s physical layout, at design
time, in a way that makes it challenging for a foundry-side attacker
to modify.
Detection is more commonly studied than prevention and con-
sists primarily of two techniques [54]: 1) side-channel analysis
and 2) functional testing. Side-channel analysis attempts to detect
noticeable deviations in power usage, electromagnetic (EM) emana-
tions, performance (timing), etc. [2, 24, 40, 44]. It often requires a
“golden” reference chip to be effective, and can only detect the side-
channel signature deviations greater than those caused by process
variation (i.e., the hardware Trojan must have a large physical foot-
print). Alternatively, functional testing attempts to inadvertently
trigger the Trojan by activating as many logic paths through the
circuit as possible. Functional testing does not require any “golden”
reference chip, but it requires the Trojan’s trigger to be activated
by the IC’s common mode operation, as exhaustive testing of even
a moderately complex integrate circuit is infeasible.
As the limitations of existing detection-based approaches be-
come clear [61], prevention-based defenses against hardware Tro-
jans have recently emerged. To the best of our knowledge, only
three preventive hardware Trojan defense mechanisms have been
explored [4, 5, 60]. All three are placement-centric, attempting to in-
crease the device layer (core) density by filling open spaces with in-
terconnected functional logic gates. Thus, making it challenging for
an attacker to find open space in the design to insert his/her Trojan
logic gates. However, there are several problems with placement-
centric defenses. As Ba et al. [5] point out, the BISA cell approach
proposed by Xiao et al. [60] is infeasible as it requires 100% place-
ment density. Contrast this with the sub-70% density of current IC
layouts that ensures routability. If 100% density were feasible, every
IC design would be manufactured that way to save cost. Alterna-
tively, Ba et al. [4, 5] suggest targeted filling: only filling placement
sites that are located closest to “security-critical” logic with tamper-
evident logic. However, as shown in our evaluation, this defense
can prevents the insertion of large Trojans, or Trojans with tight
timing constraints.
Unfortunately, no single technique is effective at detecting, and/or
preventing, the insertion of the stealthiest known additive hardware
Trojan [61]. To fill this gap in current defenses, we proposeDefensive
Routing (DR), a routing-centric defense that aims to prevent foundry-
side attackers from attaching attack logic to security-critical wires.
We define DR as any routing method that protects security-critical
wires from fabrication-time alterations. Specifically, we leverage
concepts from the signal-integrity domain [20, 21] and apply them
to a security domain (addressing several technical challenges along
the way): we route “guard wires” around security-critical wires
that make it infeasible for an attacker to tap any security-critical
wire without detection (i.e., tamper evident), something character-
istic of additive Trojans (Fig. 1). Extending signal-integrity domain
techniques to the security domain entails two technical challenges::
(1) completely cover the surface area of security-critical wires,
(2) and be tamper-evident.
Additionally, contrary to placement-centric defenses, which focus
on preventing attack implementation, DR focuses on preventing
attack integration, thus it does not require filling all the empty
space in an IC design to be effective.
We make the following main contributions:
• The first routing-centric, preventative, defense to IC fabrication-
time attacks. It routes tamper-evident guard wires along-
side security-critical wires, making fabrication-time mod-
ifications to such wires infeasible and/or detectable post-
fabrication.
• Introduction and use of natural and synthetic guard wires.
Natural guard wires are inherent to the functionality of the
design that are routed nearby security-critical wires. Syn-
thetic guard wires are not inherent to the design, but are
added during the place-and-route phase of the IC design
process. Using synthetic guard wires, we demonstrate the
possibility of completely guarding all security-critical wires
in a design.
• Design and evaluation of tamper-detection mechanisms that
expose guard wire modifications.
• Automated tool-chain for inserting synthetic and natural
guard wires that integrates with existing commercial and
open-source VLSI CAD tools.
• Evaluation of the levels of defense provided by both synthetic
and natural guard wires across three security-critical IC
layouts: 1) a processor, 2) AES and 3) DSP accelerators. We
show that DR is more effective than existing placement-
centric defenses [4, 5, 60], and is capable of thwarting even
the stealthiest hardware Trojans, including A2 [61].
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 IC Design Process
Creating an Integrated Circuit (IC) consisting of a billion tran-
sistors is a complex process that requires its decomposition into
sub-processes and extensive use of automation via Computer Aided
Design (CAD) tools. The IC design process consists of five main
phases, as illustrated in Fig. 2. First, during HDL design, high-level
descriptions of the IC are written in Hardware Description Lan-
guages (HDL) like Verilog or VHDL. Next, during synthesis, the
HDL code is “compiled” into a gate-level netlist. The gate-level
netlist is then placed-and-routed (PaR) and a physical geometric
blueprint of the chip is encoded in a Graphics Database System II
(GDSII) file. Lastly, the IC is fabricated, and then packaged into a
device for mounting on a printed circuit board. In line with prior
foundry-level attack studies [4, 5, 9, 28, 60, 61], and economic forces,
we assume all design phases—except fabrication—are trusted.
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Figure 2: The IC design process consists of five main phases. We assume
fabrication (4) is the only untrusted phase, as this is often outsourced due
to economic forces. DR is deployed at the physical (layout) level, i.e., during
place-&-route.
Defensive routing is deployed at the physical (layout) level, or
during the place-and-route (PaR) design phase. During PaR, the
gate-level netlist is physically arranged onto a 3-dimensional grid,
shown in Fig. 3. The 3D grid consists of a device layer, where circuit
components (e.g., digital logic gates) are placed, and several routing
layers vertically stacked above, where wires are routed to connect
the circuit components on the device layers. Each layer is separated
by an insulating dielectric, and vias are used to connect wires on
adjacent layers.
2.2 Hardware Trojans
A hardware Trojan is a malicious modification to a circuit designed
to alter its operative functionality [8]. It consists of two main build-
ing blocks: a trigger and payload [13, 24, 59]. Prior work provides
hardware Trojan taxonomies based on the type of trigger and pay-
load designs they employ [13, 24, 59]. We adopt this taxonomy;
depicted in Fig. 4.
2.2.1 Trigger. The trigger is circuitry that initiates the delivery
of the payload when it encounters a specific state. The goal of
the trigger is to control payload deployment such that it is hidden
from test cases (stealthy), but readily deployable by the attacker
(controllable). Triggers are created by adding, removing, and/or
manipulating existing circuit components [28, 47, 54, 61], and can
be digital or analog [26, 46, 61]. The ideal trigger achieves stealth
and controllability while being small (i.e., requiring few additional
circuit components).
2.2.2 Payload. The payload is circuitry that, upon being signaled
by the trigger, alters the functionality of the victim (host) circuit.
Figure 3: Typical 3D physical IC layout designed during the place-and-
route IC design phase (Fig. 2). On the bottom is a device layer, and stacked
above are several routing layers.
Like the trigger, the payload can be analog or digital, and has a va-
riety of possible malicious effects. Prior work demonstrates Trojan
payloads that leak information [34], alter the state of the IC [61], and
render the IC inoperable [47]. One attribute all documented stealthy
and controllable hardware Trojans have in common is that they must
route a rogue wire to, or directly adjacent to, a security-critical wire
within the victim IC.
2.2.3 Fabrication-Time Attacks. Inserting a hardware Trojan at
fabrication time is different from inserting a Trojan during the front-
end design. Unlike behavioral or structural-level attackers that
maliciously modify the HDL or gate-level netlist, respectively [3,
23, 58], the fabrication-time attacker only has access to the physical
level representation of the IC design (i.e., output of phase 3 in
Fig. 2). Specifically, they must edit the geometric representation of
the circuit layout. While this is more challenging than editing the
design at the behavioral- (HDL) or structural-level (netlist), where
design specific semantics are more readily interpretable, it is even
more difficult to defend. The post-fabrication defender receives a
literal black box from the foundry. Comprehensively inspecting
each fabricated die to verify the absence of malicious perturbations
is infeasible for the most advanced hardware Trojans [61].
Inserting a hardware Trojan into a target IC design at fabrication-
time involves two steps: Trojan placement and Trojan rout-
ing [61]. The former is the process of finding empty space on the
IC’s device layer to add additional circuit components, e.g., logic
gates, to construct the Trojan trigger and payload components. Tro-
jan routing involves both routing the trigger and payload circuit
components together and routing the trigger/payload circuitry to a
target security-critical wire(s). Prior work increases the difficulty of
Trojan placement by filling empty spaces on the IC’s device layer
with functional logic gates [4, 5, 60]. While effective for Trojans
with large footprints, filling all placement sites is infeasible [5],
leaving the IC still vulnerable to Trojans with small footprints [61].
Orthogonally, DR aims to increase the difficulty of Trojan routing by
protecting security-critical wires.
2.3 Interconnect Models
The are two main ways to model IC wires (interconnect): lumped
and transmission-line models [6]. Lumped interconnect models ap-
proximate interconnects using networks of resistors and capacitors.
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Figure 4: A hardware Trojan is an undesired alteration to an IC design for
the purpose of modifying its functionality. Hardware Trojans can be classi-
fied based on the construction of their two main components: trigger and
payload [13, 24, 59].
Transmission-line models approximate interconnects as transmis-
sion lines with a characteristic impedance and propagation delay.
The choice of interconnect model is a function of maximum
frequency component to wire length [52]. A common rule of thumb
for IC interconnects is: a wire is considered a transmission line if
its length is greater than ≈10% of the wavelength of the maximum
frequency component it transmits [52]. In digital electronics, it is
common to think of signals in terms rise and fall times, rather
than maximum frequency component. Thus, one can modify the
prior rule of thumb to: a wire is considered a transmission line if
the transmitted signal rise time, Tr ise , is less than twice the wire’s
propagation delay, Tpd [52]. Eq. (1) captures this rule of thumb.
Model =
{
Transmission Line, Tr ise < 2Tpd
Lumped RC, otherwise
(1)
Choosing the right model is vital to understanding operational
limitations and ensuring signal integrity within an IC design. For
example, an interconnect that carries high-speed signal transitions
will observe signal reflections from impedance discontinuities that
are destructive to the signal integrity of the overall system. Mod-
eling such interconnects using a lumped RC model can hide these
destructive effects, while a transmission-line model would not.
2.4 Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR)
Time-domain reflectometry (TDR) is a transmission line analysis
technique that involves injecting a single rising pulse down a trans-
mission line and analyzing its reflection(s). TDR enables us to de-
duce many characteristics about the device under test (DUT)—the
transmission line—such as impedance discontinuities, propagation
delays, dielectric constant, and so on [17, 22]. By Eq. 1, the faster the
rising edge of TDR’s incident pulse, the finer-grain of propagation
delay changes are detectable. TDR was first developed as a fault-
analysis technique for long transmission lines, such as telephone
or optical communication lines [43, 49]. As commercial TDR sys-
tems became more advanced, TDR became a standard IC packaging
fault analysis tool [14, 41, 48]. Researchers have now demonstrated
terahertz level TDR systems capable of locating faults in IC inter-
connects to nanometer scale accuracies [12, 39, 53, 55]. With such
fine-grain resolution, TDR is an ideal tamper-analysis technique
for ensuring the integrity of the guard wires used in DR.
3 THREAT MODEL
We adopt a threat model in which all phases of the IC design pro-
cess are trusted except fabrication (Fig. 2). The untrusted foundry
threat model stems from the extreme ramp-up costs associated
with fabricating leading-edge silicon [30, 31] that make outsourc-
ing IC fabrication a necessity—even for nation states. In line with
similar threat models [46, 54, 61], we assume that any fabrication-
time modification(s) are carried out by a malicious actor within
the foundry (or any foundry partners) that has access only to the
physical representation of the IC in the form of a GDSII file. The
adversary can see and modify the entire IC layout.
While there are many types of hardware Trojans [46] (§ 2.2), we
focus on additive Trojans, rather than subtractive or substitution
Trojans. Additive Trojans require adding additional circuit compo-
nents and wiring to the IC design. We focus on additive Trojans
since the only non-additive hardware Trojans conceived are the
dopant-level Trojans [28, 47], but both have limited controllability
and are detectable with optical microscopy [51].
To successfully implement an additive hardware Trojan, the ad-
versary must complete both Trojan placement and Trojan rout-
ing, without being exposed. Namely, they must 1) find empty space
on the device layer to insert the Trojan’s trigger and payload com-
ponents, e.g., logic gates, and 2) locate an unblocked segment on a
security-critical wire to attach the Trojan components to. They are
restricted from modifying the dimensions of the chip and/or vio-
lating manufacturing design rules that would risk exposure. They
are allowed to move components and/or existing wiring around,
but are constrained by available resources (e.g., time) and correct-
ness from making mass perturbations to the layout. As process
technologies scale, manufacturing design rules become increas-
ingly complex [50]. Thus, rearranging components and/or existing
wiring comes at a substantial cost. The time to complete any layout
modifications, and verify such modifications have not violated de-
sign correctness, cannot disrupt the fabrication turn-around time
expected by their customers.2 Additionally, the attacker avoids
any modifications that are detectable using existing test case- or
side-channel-based defenses. While it is trivial for an attacker with
infinite time and resources to reverse engineer the physical layout
into HDL, add a Trojan, and re-run the design through the entire
IC design process (Fig 2)—generating an entirely new layout—we
assume such an attack is infeasible in the hard time limits of fabri-
cation contracts, thus outside the scope of our threat model.
4 DEFENSIVE ROUTING (DR)
The two steps of inserting a hardware Trojan at fabrication-time
are Trojan placement and Trojan routing (§ 2.2.3). Thus, the
two logical approaches for defending against fabrication-time at-
tacks are centered around making Trojan placement and/or Trojan
routing challenging for an adversary. Specifically, DR takes a di-
rected approach to make Trojan routing intractable by eliminating
any potential interface points between a hardware Trojan and the
victim IC. We leverage the common observation that only a subset
2Typically, fabrication turn-around times are approximately 3 months [29, 57].
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Figure 5: There are three different ways an attacker could bypass guard
wires to connect a rogue Trojan wire to a security-critical wire: A) delete the
guard wire(s), B) cut the guard wire(s), C) re-route (move) the guard wires out
of the way.
of an IC is security-critical [19, 56], hence the target of a hardware
Trojan. This observation enables the practicality of DR.
DR protects security-critical wires by surrounding them in guard
wires (Fig. 1). Guard wires shield the surfaces of security-critical
wires, thus creating an additional obstacle for adversaries to over-
come. To complete Trojan routing (§ 2.2.3), attackers must bypass
the guard wires by exposing a surface of a security-critical wire(s)
before attaching a rogue Trojan wire. There are three ways an
attacker can bypass guard wires (Fig. 5): A) delete, B) cut, or C) re-
route. In a deletion attack, an entire guard wire is simply removed
from the layout. In a cutting attack, only part of the guard wire
trace is removed. In a re-route attack, the guard wire is left intact,
but part of it is moved out of the way. The easiest (minimal-edit)
re-route attack would be to jog either a top or bottom guard wire
to attach a rogue Trojan wire to a security-critical wire using a via
(layer jumping connection), as shown in Fig. 5c. Such an attack
both 1) lengthens the guard wire and 2) introduces bends in the
guard wire.3
Therefore, our challenge is to design guard wires that are tamper-
evident. Deletion and cutting attacks are trivial to detect with a conti-
nuity test. Re-route attacks, however, are more challenging to detect.
Detecting a re-route attack requires the ability to measure physical
characteristics (e.g., length) about a guard wire post-fabrication.
While re-route attacks are difficult to detect, they are also more
difficult to implement. Any edits an adversary makes to the lay-
out must not violate manufacturing design rules (§ 3). When the
design-density is high, re-route attacks are difficult for an attacker
to implement as leading-edge process technologies have thousands
of manufacturing design constraints [50].
Based on these attack considerations, we design two types of
guard wires with varying tamper-evident properties and deploy-
ment costs: natural and synthetic guard wires. We summarize
each guard wire type in Fig. 6, and their tamper-evident-properties/
deployment-costs in Fig. 7.
3Note, moving guard wire(s) without modifying their shapes or lengths is infeasible
even for moderately dense designs. As an added assurance, the final IC layout is
analyzed to ensure such a move is not possible without invoking additional layout
modifications (§ 3).
Figure 6: We design two types of guard wires: natural and synthetic. Natu-
ral guard wires re-purpose wires inherent to the host IC design. Alternatively,
synthetic guard wires are added to the design during place-and-route. Note:
same-layer guard wire end-caps not shown for clarity.
4.1 Natural Guard Wires
Natural guard wires (Fig. 6a) are wires inherent to the host IC design
that are routed nearby security-critical wires. They create hyper-
local routing densities nearby security-critical wires, thus limiting,
or eliminating the locations on security-critical wires where an at-
tacker can attach rogue Trojan wires. By re-purposing pre-existing
wires as guard wires, natural guard wires have no hardware over-
head. However, there are additional routing constraints (e.g., length,
layer, location and spacing) that accompany natural guard wires,
thus making deployment challenging, i.e., it is difficult to completely
protect all surfaces of all security-critical wires (Fig. 10).
Natural guard wires are inherently tamper-evident with respect
to deletion and cutting attacks (Fig. 7). An adversary cannot delete
or significantly modify natural guard wires without risking alter-
ation of the functionality and/or operating specifications of the
host IC, and thus being exposed. Natural guard wires may also
be re-route tamper-evident depending on routing-constraints, e.g.,
if the natural guard wires are critical paths in the IC (i.e., timing
sensitive).
4.2 Synthetic Guard Wires
Synthetic guard wires are not inherent to the host IC design. They
are added to the design during the place-and-route IC design phase
(Fig. 2). They eliminate the accessible surface area of security-
critical wires, blocking an attacker from attaching a Trojan wire at
fabrication-time. Synthetic guard wires incur hardware overhead,
i.e., additional wires. However, they are easier to deploy as they
are not subject to additional routing constraints. Therefore, it is
possible to protect all surfaces of all security-critical wires in a
design (Fig. 10).
There are several synthetic guard wire architectures that may be
deployed, listed in order of increasing difficulty of deployment: 1)
fully-disjoint, 2) partially-connected, and 3) fully-connected. Fully-
disjoint synthetic guard wires are not connected between sides, i.e.,
the guard wires on each side of a security-critical wire are never
connected to one another. Partially-connected guard wires allow for
a single guard wire to be utilized on multiple sides. For example, a
security-critical wire could be guarded on the north, east, and west
sides by a single guard wire that wraps around the security-critical
5
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Figure 7: Natural guard wires require no hardware overhead, but have ad-
ditional routing constraints governing their deployment. They are tamper-
evident with respect to deletion and cutting attacks (Fig. 5). Synthetic guard
wires require additional wires, but no additional routing constraints. Syn-
thetic guard wires are tamper-evident with respect to all guard wires attacks
(Fig. 5) using post-fabrication fault analysis techniques like continuity tests
and TDR [12, 39, 53, 55].
wire. Lastly, fully-connected guard wires are formed when a single
guard wire is routed around all sides of all security-critical wires.
Unlike natural guard wires, synthetic guard wires are not inher-
ently tamper-evident. To enable post-fabrication tamper analysis
(§ 2.4 and 6.4), the analog characteristics of guard wire segments
must be observable. This can be implemented either on-chip, e.g.,
with internal sensors [25] or ring oscillators [63], or off-chip, e.g.,
with an I/O pin and a one-time programmable fabric [35].
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We develop an automated tool-chain for deploying DR in modern
IC designs. Our toolchain integrates with existing IC design flows
(Fig. 2) that utilize commercial VLSI CAD tools. Specifically, we
implement the DR toolchain around the Cadence Innovus Imple-
mentation System [11], a commercial place-and-route (PaR) CAD
tool. The tool-chain is invoked by modifying a place-and-route TCL
script,4 as shown in Fig. 8.
5.1 Place-&-Route Process
The PaR design phase (Fig. 2) is typically automated by a CAD tool,
programmatically driven by TCL script(s). There are several steps to
PaR that are performed in the following order: 1) floorplanning, 2)
placement, 3) clock tree synthesis, 4) routing, and 5) filling. To ensure
that all guard-wires are routed optimally, we modify the order of these
PaR steps. Specifically, after floorplanning (1), we use our automated
toolchain to place security critical components and route security-
critical- and guard- wires. Our toolchain then permanently fixes
the locations of these components and wires to prevent the PaR
CAD tool from modifying their positions and/or shapes throughout
the remainder of the PaR process. Lastly, we utilize the PaR CAD
tool to place non-security-critical components (2), synthesize the
clock tree (3), route non-security-critical (4) and fill the design with
filler (cap) cells.
5.2 Automated Toolchain
The DR toolchain automates the insertion of either natural or syn-
thetic guard wires around security-critical wires. The toolchain
consists of three main phases (Fig. 8). The first phase (A) identifies
security-critical nets. The second phase (B) identifies the unblocked
4Tool Command Language (TCL) scripts are the standard programmatic interface to
commercial VLSI CAD tools. IC designers often develop a set of scripts for driving the
CAD tools that automate most of the IC design process (Fig. 2).
Figure 8: DR is an automated toolchain consisting of three phases. Our
toolchain first identifies which wires are security-critical, determines poten-
tial (unblocked) attachment points, and routes guard wires to block all attach-
ment points. Security-critical components & wires are placed & routed before
phase (A) of our toolchain is invoked. Before continuing with the traditional
PaR flow, the security-critical nets and their guard wires are locked in-place
to ensure they are untouched throughout the remainder of the layout process.
surfaces of all security-critical interconnect within a GDSII-encoded
layout. The last phase (C) guards the security-critical interconnects
by routing guard wires nearby. We provide additional implementa-
tion details on all three stages of the DR toolchain below.
5.2.1 Identifying Security-Critical Nets. The first phase of DR
requires identifying those nets that are security-critical (i.e., wires
to guard). Like prior work [23, 35], we assume the designer has
annotated the HDL to flag nets that are to be treated as “security-
critical” by appending a unique prefix to such signal names. 5 From
here, we perform a circuit-level dataflow analysis to generate signal
fan-in graphs from the hand-annotated HDL. Specifically, our tool
takes as input a Verilog netlist and the (root signal) annotations,
and returns a graph detailing the signal(s) that comprise the fan-in
to those root signals, to a configurable depth.
Given the interconnected nature of signals within an IC de-
sign, an adversary may elect to target a wire that influences a root
security-critical wire, rather than the root wire itself. To address
this indirection, our tool widens the set of signals deemed “security-
critical” beyond the scope of those (hand-annotated) root security-
critical signals. Since the netlist is often modified by the PaR CAD
tool to meet various design constraints (e.g., power, performance,
and area), we invoke our dataflow analysis after all security-critical
wires have first been routed (§ 5). Note: while CAD tools can op-
timize (i.e., modify) the design netlist through the IC design flow,
they leave signal name prefixes intact.
5.2.2 IdentifyingUnblockedWire Surfaces. The second phase
of DR identifying the unblocked surfaces of security-critical inter-
connect in a physical IC layout, i.e. potential Trojanwire attachment
locations. To do so, we use GDS2Score [37], an open-source frame-
work for computing security metrics over an IC layout. GDS2Score
5Prior work [23, 35] makes the same assumption as security-critical signals are best
identified at the HDL level, where there are additional design semantics. Additional
work has also demonstrated ways of making such classifications at the HDL level
semi-autonomously [19, 23, 62].
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Figure 9: Defensively routed OR1200 processor SoC with natural (A) and
synthetic (B) guard wires deployed around the privilege-bit signal wire (red).
DR prevents an attacker from attaching a rouge wire to modify this signal.
takes as input a GSDII file (encoding an IC layout) and a security-
critical signal graph (dataflow analysis output), and computes secu-
rity metrics detailing the IC layout’s fabrication-time attack surface.
GDS2Score provides three metrics: 1) net blockage, 2) trigger space,
and 3) route distance. Specifically, the GDS2Score net blockage
metric reports the location of all security-critical wires within the
layout, and the surfaces of each security-critical wire that are un-
blocked. By computing the net blockage metric immediately after
all security-critical wires are routed, GDS2Score provides exact
locations of where to route guard wires.
5.2.3 Guard Unblocked Wire Surfaces. The last stage of the
DR toolchain (Fig. 8) is a custom guard wire routing tool. We im-
plement this tool in Python. It takes as input exact locations of
security-critical wires and their unblocked sides (output from the
GDS2Score net blockage metric) and generates a TCL script that
integrates with the Cadence Innovus Digital Implementation plat-
form [11] to automatically route the guard wires. This TCL script
is executed immediately after the security-critical wires have been
routed, but before placing the remaining non-security critical com-
ponents. Depending on the type of guard wires being deployed,
natural, synthetic, or both, different guard wire TCL scripts are
generated as described below.
Natural GuardWires. There are numerous ways natural guard
wires can be implemented. Since commercial PaR CAD tools do
not offer an interface to enable fine-grain constraints between
two unrelated signal wires, we develop an indirect method for
implementing natural guard wires. We implement natural guard
wires by constraining placement and routing resources nearby
security-critical wires. First, we identify all circuit components (i.e.,
logic gates) connected to all security-critical wires, i.e., security-
critical components. Next, we draw a bounding box around these
components and extend this boundary vertically by 10% of the
overall box height, and horizontally by 10% of the overall box width.
Then, we set placement and routing density screens in the portion
of the IC layout that lies outside the security-critical bounding box.
These constraints limit the placement and routing resources outside
the bounding box, thus forcing more components and wiring within
the bounding box. With increased routing density nearby security-
critical wires, they are less accessible by Trojan payload delivery
wires. The density screen configuration settings are optimized to
maximize the net blockage metric computed by the GDS2Score
metric. Fig. 9a depicts natural guard wires deployed around the
security-critical privilege bit signal of the OR1200 processor IC
design.
SyntheticGuardWires. Synthetic guardwires aremore straight-
forward to implement. The automated guard wire deployment
toolchain locates all unblocked surfaces (north, south, east, west,
top, and bottom) of all security-critical wires and routes guard wires
in these regions. After all guard wire segments are routed, they
are connected according to the architecture chosen (§ 4.2). Fig. 9b
depicts synthetic guard wires deployed around the security-critical
privilege bit signal of the OR1200 processor IC design.
6 EVALUATION
We evaluate DR in three areas. First, we explore the effectiveness of
DR at closing the fabrication-time attack surface of three security-
critical IC designs of commercial complexity, comparing the capa-
bilities of DR with state-of-the-art layout-level defenses [4, 5, 60].
Next, we demonstrate the practicality of DR, analyzing its power,
performance, and area overheads. Finally, we perform a threat as-
sessment, demonstrating how guard wires are tamper-evident.
6.1 Experimental Setup
6.1.1 IC Designs. We utilize three IC designs for our evaluation:
OR1200 processor SoC, AES accelerator, and DSP accelerator. The
OR1200 processor SoC is an open-source design [42] used in previ-
ous fabrication-time attack studies [61]. The AES and DSP accel-
erator designs are open-sourced under the Common Evaluation
Platform (CEP) benchmark suite [36]. The OR1200 processor SoC
consists of a 5-stage pipelined OR1200 CPU that implements the 32-
bit OR1K instruction set and Wishbone bus interface. It runs Linux
and busybox. The AES accelerator supports 128-bit key sizes. The
DSP accelerator implements a Fast Fourier Transform algorithm.
All designs target a 45nm Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI) process
technology. They are synthesized with Cadence Genus (v16.23)
and placed-and-routed using Cadence Innovus (v17.1). All designs
target a 100MHz clock frequency and a core density of 60–70%.
All ICs are synthesized and placed-and-routed on a server with
2.5GHz Intel Xeon E5-2640 CPU and 64 GB of memory running
Red Hat Enterprise Linux (v6.9).
6.1.2 Root Security-Critical Signals. Signals (nets) are classi-
fied as security-critical if they are apart of the fan-in to a set of
root security critical signals that are hand annotated by the HDL
designer (§ 5.2.1). For the OR1200 processor design, we select the
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supervisor signal (supv) as security critical, because altering this sig-
nal enables an attacker to escalate the privilege mode of the entire
processor, as shown in previous work [18, 26, 61]. For the AES accel-
erator, we mark the 32-bit key-loading register as security-critical.
Attacking the key-loading register of the AES accelerator enables
the attacker to leak encryption keys. Lastly, for the DSP accelera-
tor, we mark the the next_out signal as security-critical. The DSP
accelerator’s next_out signal indicates to external hardware when
an FFT computation is ready at the output registers. Tampering
with the next_out signal allows the attacker to hide specific outputs
of the chip. Fig. 12 (far right) shows the number of interconnect
wires our automated toolchain classifies as security-critical, with
the aforementioned root signals marked as security-critical, for
each IC layout.
6.2 Effectiveness
We first evaluate the effectiveness of DR in thwarting the insertion
of hardware Trojans at fabrication-time. We compare the degree of
protection provided by DR with that provided by deploying another
layout-level defense suggested by Ba et al. [4, 5]. This placement-
based defense involves filling as many empty component placement
sites as possible (they show that filling 100% of placement sites is
infeasible), prioritizing empty sites nearest security-critical nets.We
use our automated toolchain (§ 5.2) to deploy both types of guard
wires (natural and synthetic). We simulate Ba et al.’s placement
defense [4, 5] using a custom GDS2Score extension.
6.2.1 GDS2Score. We use the open-source GDS2Score frame-
work [37] to quantify the effectiveness of each defense. GDS2Score
analyzes the physical layout of an IC (encoded in a GSDII file) com-
putes security metrics detailing the IC layout’s fabrication-time
attack surface.
GDS2Score provides three metrics: 1) net blockage, 2) trigger
space, and 3) route distance. Thenet blockagemetric computes the
percentage of surface area of security-critical nets that are blocked
by other circuit components or wiring. The trigger space metric
computes the amount of unused placement sites on the device
layer that may be utilized by an adversary to place a Trojan trigger
or payload circuit(s). Lastly, the route distance metric computes
the minimal distance between unblocked security-critical nets and
unused placement sites that an adversary would have to route a
rogue Trojan wire to “connect” the hardware Trojan to the host
IC. The trigger space metric details the difficulty of performing
Trojan placement, while the net blockage and route distance metrics
detail the difficulty of performing Trojan routing. Specifically, we
use GDS2Score’s net blockage and route distance security metrics
to compare both types of DR guard wires and placement-centric
defenses across the three test IC designs.
6.2.2 Net Blockage Results. Both types of guard wires, natu-
ral and synthetic, attempt to block security-critical interconnect
wires to prevent attackers from attaching rogue wires to them,
thus, minimizing/eliminating possible Trojan configurations, i.e.,
(security-critical-wire, trigger-space6) pairs. We use GDS2Score’s
6“Trigger-spaces” are a GDS2Score term for contiguous open placement sites on the
device layer.
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Figure 10: Plot of the GDS2Score net blockage metric computed across
three different IC layouts, with and without guard wires.
net blockage metric to compute the surface-area-coverage differ-
ences between natural and synthetic guard wires. Fig. 10 compares
the net blockage computed across 9 total IC layouts: three circuit
designs with no guard wires, natural guard wires, and synthetic
guard wires.
Across all three designs, synthetic guard wire provide more
protection than natural guard wires. Specifically, for all 3 designs,
synthentic guard wires achieve 100% net blockage. This means that
there is no place on any security-critical net in these designs where
an attacker can attach a rogue wire. Natural guard wires are unable
to achieve 100% coverage due mainly to having to meet their own
routing constraints which prevents our tool from creating enough
nets to block an entire security-critical wire.
6.2.3 Route Distance Results. Since DR only limits the routing
resources needed to insert a Trojan at fabrication time, it is vital
to understand how DR reduces the overall fabrication-time attack
surface, i.e., both Trojan routing and placement resources (trigger
spaces). We use GDS2Score’s route distance metric to enumerate all
possible (security-critical-wire, trigger-space) pairs, i.e., all available
Trojan placement and routing resources an attacker can utilize to
insert a Trojan at fabrication time. Namely, we use GDS2Score’s
route distance metric to illustrate the attack surface of a given IC
layout.
Fig. 11 shows the route distance metric as computed across three
different IC designs, with and without layout-level defenses includ-
ing: 1) DR (both natural and synthetic guard wires) and 2) defensive
placement. Each heatmap is intended to be analyzed column-wise,
where each column is a histogram of the distances between un-
blocked security-critical wires and trigger-spaces within a size
range. Namely, each heatmap illustrates the fabrication-time attack
surface of each IC layout. If a circuit has no attack configurations,
i.e., all security-critical wires are blocked or there are no trigger-
spaces, the route distance heatmap is completely dark (column
ratios of 0). If it is impossible to eradicate all attack configurations,
the most secure layout for such a circuit would have maximum
distances between unblocked security-critical wires and trigger-
spaces, i.e., a heatmap with the top row the lightest color (top row
ratios of 1). This is because larger distances increase the signal delay
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Figure 11: Plot of the GDS2Score route distance metric computed across three different IC layouts, with and without guard wires and Ba et al.’s defensive
placement [4, 5]. Each heatmap illustrates the percentage of (security-critical-wire, trigger-space) pairs (possible attack configurations) of varying distances apart.
The heatmaps are intended to be analyzed by column, as each column encodes a histogram of possible attack configurations with trigger-spaces of a given size
range (X-axis). Route distances (Y-axis) are displayed in terms of standard deviations frommeannet length in each respective design.Heatmaps that are completely
dark indicate no possible attack configurations exist, i.e. no placement/routing resources to insert a Trojan.
for the hardware Trojan; increasing the challenge of the attacker
to meet timing constraints for their attack.
Synthetic guardwires outperformnatural guardwires and placement-
centric defenses. For all three IC designs, synthetic guard wires
were able to close the fabrication-time attack-surface by completely
blocking all security-critical wires (Fig. 10). Thus, DR demonstrates
an effective layout-level defense.
6.3 Practicality
DR is effective, but is it practical? We evaluate the cost of deploy-
ing DR across the three IC layouts. Specifically, we analyze the
power, route density, and performance (timing) overheads incurred
by deploying both natural and synthetic guard wires. While it is
common to analyze power, performance, and area, of an IC layout,
we instead analyze power, performance and route density. Area
measurements of a layout refer to the device-layer area, i.e., width
and length, since the height (number of routing layers) is fixed for
a given process technology. Since DR does not require additional
logic gates, we do not increase the width and height (area) of the
core area, rather DR alters the total wire length in the design. Thus,
measuring routing density overhead is more meaningful. We use
the built-in features of Cadence tools to compute these overheads.
Fig. 12 details our results. Power and timing overheads were both
less than 1%. In some cases, the timing was better for the guard wire
9
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Figure 12: DR hardware overheads. The far right plot highlights the number of wires deemed security-critical in each design for context.
designs. This is expected as DR does not require any additional logic
gates, nor lengthen existing wires. Rather, the guard wires increase
routing constraints that can push the PaR CAD tool to produce
more optimal routing solutions. The route density overheadwas less
than 1% for all natural guard wires, and similar for synthetic guard
wires when the number of security-critical wires to guard is small,
namely the OR1200 and DSP layout. Intuitively, the more guard
wires inserted, the higher the routing density increase. Keeping
route density low is important to ensure automated CAD tools can
route each design. However, even though all layouts targeted a
placement density (density of logic gates on the device layer) of 60–
70%, route density was relatively low even with guard wires. This
was due to the characteristics of the designs and process technology
(i.e., back-end-of-line metal stack option).
6.4 Threat Analysis
Lastly, we provide a threat analysis of DR. Recall (Fig. 5), there
are three ways an attacker could bypass guard wires to carry out
a fabrication-time attack: A) delete a guard wire, B) cut a guard
wire, or C) re-route a guard wire. The first two attacks, deletion
and cutting, are trivial to detect (§ 4). The third attack, guard wire
re-route, is the most sophisticated (Fig. 5c). Only synthetic guard
wires can reliably detect such an attack using TDR (Fig. 7).
6.4.1 Smallest Re-route Attack. The minimum (re-route) attack
edit an adversary canmake to a guard wire is to jog a top (or bottom)
guard wire to an adjacent routing track, and attach to the security-
critical wire from above (or below) with a via, as illustrated in
Figure 5c. This edit is minimal because the the minimal metal pitch
(MMP), or (horizontal) distance between the centers of adjacent
routing tracks on the same routing layer, is much smaller than the
(vertical) distance between overlapping routing tracks on adjacent
routing layers. Specifically, the smallest (re-route) attack edit would
increase a guard wire’s length by: Lattack = 2 ∗ MMPr , where
MMPr is the MMP on layer, r , which is defined in the design rules
of a given process technology. Table 1 summarizes the minimal-
length-edits to a synthetic guard wire an attacker must make to
bypass DR, according to the 45nm process technology we target in
this study.
6.4.2 Tamper Detection with TDR. When IC interconnects are
injected with a pulsed waveform with a rise time less than twice the
propagation delay of the interconnect, they behave like transmis-
sion lines (Eq. (1)). Hence, time-domain reflectometry (TDR) can be
used to measure several characteristics of synthetic guard wires to
ensure they have not been tampered with (§ 2.4). Specifically, the
lengths of each guard wire can be analyzed with TDR to detect if
they have been altered. Once measured, the lengths can be com-
pared with that predicted by a 3D electromagnetic field solver [33].
While modeling all interconnects within a large complex IC using
a field solver is computationally impractical, it is practical to ana-
lyze only a small subset of interconnects, e.g., the guard wires and
surrounding circuit structures [39].
Prior work demonstrates terahertz TDR systems [12, 39, 53, 55]
capable of measuring the propagation delay of an interconnect to
an accuracy of ±2.6 femptoseconds (f s). Such systems utilize laser-
driven optoelectronic measurement techniques to achieve such high
resolutions. According to the ideal transmission line model [52], the
propagation delay, Tpd , is a function of the dielectric constant, Dk ,
speed of light, C , and length of the transmission line (guard
wire), Lдw , as shown in Eq. (2).
Tpd = Lдw ∗
√
Dk
C
(2)
Table 1:Minimumguardwire re-route attack (Fig. 5) edit–distances for each
routing layer in our target (IBM 45nm SOI) process technology.
Routing Min Wire Min Metal Min Attack TDR
Layer Spacing (um) Pitch (um) Edit (um) Detectable?
1 0.07 0.14 0.28 ✓
2 0.07 0.14 0.28 ✓
3 0.07 0.14 0.28 ✓
4 0.09 0.19 0.38 ✓
5 0.09 0.19 0.38 ✓
6 0.14 0.28 0.56 ✓
7 0.14 0.28 0.56 ✓
8 0.80 1.60 3.20 ✓
9 0.80 1.60 3.20 ✓
10 2.00 4.00 8.00 ✓
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Figure 13: Worst-case manufacturing process variation (error bars) effect
on unmodified and minimal re-route attacks on 100-micron guard-wires.
6.4.3 Process Variation& TDRAccuracy. TDR is the ideal tam-
per detection tool as process variation has no impact on its accuracy.
Recall that knowing the inter-layer dielectric constant of the in-
sulating material surrounding synthetic guard wires is all that is
required to compute their lengths using TDR ( Eq. (2)). The dielec-
tric constant of the inter-layer dielectric is not dependent on its
geometric properties, thus the dielectric constant is usually very
well controlled [10].
6.4.4 Process Variation &GuardWire Lengths. Detecting the
minimal guard-wire re-route attack requires detecting the smallest
increase to a guard wire’s length required to move it out of the way
(§ 6.4.1). This distance is larger than the worst-case manufac-
turing process variation in a guard wire’s length. Namely, with
Lattack as the minimum length guard wire (re-route) attack edit,
Ldesiдn as the designed length of the guard wire, and Lwc_error ,
as the worst-case manufacturing error in the actual guard wire’s
length (+ or -):
Ldesiдn − Lwc_error + Lattack > Ldesiдn + Lwc_error (3)
For a guard wire on routing layer r , theworst-casemanufacturing
error, Lwc_error , can be deduced from the manufacturing design
rules as:
Lwc_error = 2 ∗ min_spacinдr2
=min_spacinдr
(4)
, wheremin_spacinдr is theminimum required spacing surrounding
a wire routed on metal layer, r .
We illustrate this in Figure 13, where we plot theminimum length
differences between unmodified (un-attacked) andminimally-rerouted
(attacked) guard wires, overlaid with error bars indicating the worst-
case range of variation in a guard wires fabricated length caused by
process variation. Even in the worst case, across all routing layers,
unmodified vs attacked guard wires are discernible.
6.4.5 TDR Simulation. Using the TDR propagation delay model
described in Eq. 2, and the previously studied capabilities of opto-
electrical terahertz TDR [12, 39, 53, 55], we simulate the difference
in reflection times for single pulse TDR waveforms applied to syn-
thetic guard wires of various lengths. Specifically we compare the
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Figure 14: Number of TDR wire length measurements required to detect
minimal re-route attacks (Tab. 1) with 95% and 99% confidence, per layer.
reflection time of an (unmodified) 100 micron long guard wire and
compare it to the reflection time observed from a similar guard
wire that has been lengthened by the minimal attack edit distance
for each routing layer (Tab. 1). We assume a dielectric constant of
3.9, the nominal dielectric constant of silicon dioxide [27]. Taking
into account a (Gaussian) standard error (across reflection time
measurements) of ± 2.6 f s , as reported by [39], we compute the
minimum number of TDR measurements required to discriminate
an unmodified guard wire from an attacked guard wire with confi-
dence levels of 95% and 99%. We plot these results in Figure 14. Our
results demonstrate that existing terahertz TDR systems are capable
of detecting the minimum re-route attacks across all routing layers
(Tab. 1) in our target 45nm process, requiring at most 14 and 24
TDR measurements to achieve confidence levels of 95% and 99%,
respectively.
7 DISCUSSION
DR targets the prevention of fabrication-time attacks. Experiments
with IC layouts of three designs show that it is effective, deployable,
and tamper-resistant. Provided below is additional discussion on
its signal integrity impact, flexibility, scalability, and extensibility.
Signal Integrity Impact.Routing longwires parallel to security-
critical wires increases coupling capacitance, thus creating cross-
talk between the guard and security-critical wires. However, syn-
thetic guard wires are not actively driven (and can be grounded)
during normal chip operation. Thus, cross-talk is not an issue—in
fact, synthetic guard wires decrease cross-talk by acting as sheilds
between security-critical signals and the rest of the circuit. Natural
guard wires, on the other hand, have the potential to cause signal
integrity and timing issues. These issues can be avoided by only
using wires with low switching rates as natural guard wires.
Defense-in-Depth. While DR alone is capable of thwarting
even the stealthiest fabrication-time attacks, its low deployment
costs enable defense-in-depth. Layering DR with other preventive
measures, such as Ba et al.’s defensive placement [4, 5], provides
an additional layer of protection.
Scalability.Although Moore’s law is near at its limit, transistors
continue to shrink. Only three companies are capable of manufac-
turing 7–10nm transistors [31]. It is, therefore, vital for DR to scale
with process technology. With respect to deletion or cutting attacks
11
Under Publication Review, June 20, 2019 Timothy Trippel, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, and Matthew Hicks
(Fig. 5), both natural and synthetic guard wires scale with process
technology advancements as continuity checks are the only tests
necessary to detect tampering. With respect to re-route attacks,
synthetic guard wires will scale, provided TDR capabilities con-
tinue to scale. This is likely as advancements in microelectronic
feature sizes translate to advancements in the technologies built
upon them.
Extensibility of CAD Tools. Our DR deployment framework
(§ 5) is built on top of a commercial IC CAD tool [11] and open-
source VLSI analysis tools [37, 38]. Extending this framework to
work across other commercial IC layout CAD tools involves incor-
porating support for each vendor’s CAD tool APIs. We foresee DR
deployed as a deeply integrated component of commercial VLSI
CAD tools as they focus more on IC security.
8 RELATEDWORK
Fabrication-time attacks and defenses have been extensively studied.
While most attacks have only been contrived in literature [9, 26, 28,
34, 47, 61], a recent Bloomberg business week article [45] claims to
have discovered the first fabrication-time attack in the wild. While
this attack was done at the PCB level, prior studies primarily focus
on the IC level, where components are much smaller and hence
easier to conceal. With respect to defenses, there have been many
proposed techniques [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 24, 32, 40, 60, 64], but
besides DR, have all failed against the A2 Trojan [61].
Fabrication-time Attacks. Attacks have spanned the trade-
space of footprint size, stealth, and controllability. Specifically,
some attacks have demonstrated stealth and controllability, at the
cost of large footprints [9, 26, 34], while others have demonstrated
small (or non-existent) footprints, at the cost of controllability and
stealth [28, 47]. The most formidable attack in particular—the A2
attack [61] —has demonstrated all three: small footprint, stealth,
and controllability.
The first fabrication-time insertion of a hardware Trojan was
developed by Lin et al. [34] who proposed a Trojan designed to leak
information over a deliberately created side channel. Specifically,
they designed and implemented a hardware Trojan, with a footprint
of approximately 100 logic gates, to create an artificial power side
channel for leaking cryptographic keys. Albeit unique at the time,
today such a large footprint makes the attack detectable via side
channel defenses [2, 7, 16].
Dopant level [9, 47] Trojans explore how altering the IC fabri-
cation process in a targeted way can produce ICs with transistors
that wear out quickly, causing the circuit to fail early. These Tro-
jans demonstrate a fabrication-time attack where no additional
circuit components need to be added, thus being extremely stealthy.
However, dopant-level Trojans have several drawbacks. First, they
have limited capabilities as they can only be constructed out of
components already in the target IC design. Second, dopant level
alterations are detectable with optical microscopy [51].
The most lethal fabrication-time attack is the A2 Trojan, devel-
oped by Yang et al. [61]. The A2 Trojan utilizes analog components
to build a counter-based trigger circuit with a footprint of less than
the size of one flip-flop. Its complex triggering mechanism makes it
stealthy, i.e., unlikely to accidentally deploy during post-fabrication
functional testing or under normal chip operation, yet is control-
lable from user-level software. Its unique design makes it the only
Trojan to evade all detection schemes, except DR.
Fabrication-time Defenses. There are two fabrication-time
attack defense strategies: detective or preventive. Most prior work
has focused on detective strategies, while few works have focused
on preventive strategies. Detective strategies involve side-channel
analysis [2, 7, 24, 40], imaging [1, 64], and on-chip sensors [16, 32].
Until DR, preventive measures been placement-focused [4, 5, 60].
We highlight both detective and preventive defenses below.
The first side-channel detection schemewas proposed byAgrawal
et al. [2]. They used power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM)
side-channel measurements to record a fingerprint of a “golden”
IC during normal, and compared this fingerprint to one acquired
from an untrusted IC. Similarly, Jin et al. [24] create a timing-based
fingerprint obtained by measuring the output delays resulting from
applying various input combinations to a given IC. While side-
channel detection schemes are effective against hardware Trojans
with large footprints, they fail at detecting Trojans like A2 [61],
whose side-channel signatures are well below operational noise
margins.
Like side-channel detection, imaging is another detective defense.
Specifically, backside imaging is a non-destructive technique that
can resolve device-layer components (Fig. 3) as this layer isn’t
blocked by any wires. Zhou et al. [64] propose filling the placement
grid with highly reflective fill cells, as opposed to the standard
fill cells used, to encode a watermark that can be captured using
backside imaging. Thus, if thewatermark has been perturbed during
fabrication, an attack has occurred. Unfortunately, this technique
requires hours to image a single IC, provides no visibility in metal
layers, and its resolution seems capped at 45 nm processes.
9 CONCLUSION
DR is the first routing-centric preventive defense against fabrication-
time attacks. It makes attaching Trojan logic to security-critical
logic in the victim IC infeasible by routing guard wires on all six
sides of security-critical wires, eliminating locations where an ad-
versary can attach rogue Trojan wires. DR guard wires are tamper
evident, indicating if a foundry-level attacker modified them to
insert a hardware Trojan. We design and implement two guard
wire variants: natural and synthetic. The former consists of wires
inherent to the host IC layout, that are vital to the functionality
of the design, but not security-critical. The latter are not inherent
to the functionality of the design, and are added during the place-
and-route IC design phase. Both guard wire variants are capable of
detecting deletion and cutting attacks. Using terahertz time-domain
reflectometry (TDR), synthetic guard wires can also detect re-route
attacks (Fig. 5) across all routing layers of our 45nm process.
We develope an automated framework for deploying both natural
and synthetic guard wires. We evaluate the effectiveness, deploya-
bility, and tamper-resistance of DR across three different IC designs
including a processor SoC, AES and DSP accelerators. The exper-
imental results show that DR thwarts the insertion of even the
stealthiest known additive hardware Trojans, across all 3 layouts,
with power, timing, and area overheads of less than 1%.
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